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Abstract
With the current increase of interest in cloud computing, the security of user data
stored in remote servers has become an important concern. Hiding access patterns of
clients can be crucial in particular applications such as stock market or patent databases.
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) is proposed to enable a client to retrieve a file
stored in a cloud server without revealing the queried file to the server. In this work,
we offer improvements to BddCpir, which is a PIR protocol proposed by Lipmaa. The
original BddCpir uses Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) as the data structure, where
data items are stored at the sink nodes of the tree. First of all, we offer the usage of
quadratic and octal trees instead, where every non-sink node has four and eight child
nodes, respectively, to reduce the depth of the tree. By adopting more shallow trees,
we obtain an improved server implementation which is an order of magnitude faster
than the original scheme, without changing the asymptotic complexity. Secondly, we
suggest a non-trivial parallelization method that takes advantage of the shared-memory
multi-core architectures to further decrease server computation latencies. Finally, we
show how to scale the PIR scheme for larger database sizes with only a small overhead
in bandwidth complexity, with the utilization of shared-memory many-core processors.
Consequently, we show how our scheme is bandwidth-efficient in terms of the data being
exchanged in a run of the CPIR protocol, in proportion to the database size.
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O¨zet
Bulut bilis¸ime ilginin artmasıyla birlikte, uzak sunucularda saklanan kullanıcı bilgi-
lerinin gu¨venlig˘i o¨nemli bir sorun haline gelmis¸tir. I˙stemcilerin eris¸im modellerini gizle-
mek, o¨zellikle borsa veya patent veritabanı gibi uygulamalarda elzem olabilmektedir.
Mahremiyet-Korumalı Bilgi Eris¸imi (PIR), bir istemcinin bulut sunucuda saklanan bir
veri o¨g˘esini (o¨rneg˘in bir dosya) sunucuya hangisine eris¸tig˘ini so¨ylemeden elde etmesini
sag˘lamak ic¸in tasarlanmıs¸ bir protokoldr. Bu tezde, Lipmaa tarafından o¨nerilen bir
PIR protokolu¨ olan BddCpir u¨zerine iyiles¸tirmeler sunulmus¸tur. Orijinal BddCpir, veri
yapısı olarak, veri o¨g˘elerini uc¸ du¨g˘u¨mlerde depolayan I˙kili Karar Diyagramlarını (BDD)
kullanmaktadır. O¨ncelikle, veri yapısı olarak BDD yerine do¨rtlu¨ ve sekizli ag˘ac¸ların kul-
lanımını o¨nerilmis¸tir. Bu tu¨r ag˘ac¸larda uc¸ olmayan her du¨g˘u¨mu¨n sırasıyla do¨rt ve sekiz
alt du¨g˘u¨mu¨ oldug˘u ic¸in, daha az derinlig˘i olan ag˘ac¸lar elde edilerek, sunucu perfor-
mansı orijinal asimptotik karmas¸ıklıg˘ı deg˘is¸meden bir mertebe iyiles¸tirilebilmektedir.
I˙kinci olarak, sunucu is¸lem gecikmesini daha da azaltabilmek ic¸in paylas¸ımlı bellek kul-
lanan c¸ok c¸ekirdekli is¸lemciler ic¸in tasarlanmıs¸ bir paralelles¸tirme yo¨ntemi sunulmus¸tur.
U¨c¸u¨ncu¨ olarak da, bu tezde o¨nerilen PIR protokolu¨nu¨n bant genis¸lig˘ine yalnızca ufak bir
ek yu¨k ekleyerek nasıl o¨lc¸eklenebileceg˘i go¨sterilmis¸tir. Son olarak, o¨nerilen protokolu¨n
bir c¸alıs¸masında harcadıg˘ı bant genis¸lig˘i bakımından, veri tabanı boyutuna oranla, ne
kadar verimli oldug˘unun analizi yapılmaktadır.
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1 Introduction
In this age of big data, cloud computing has gained a significant importance. Instead
of setting up their own servers, which is costly in terms of money and time, people
are now renting cloud servers for their immense computation and storage capabilities.
Although they are useful and easy to maintain, outsourcing to cloud servers arises
the security concerns for the data stored in these cloud-powered systems. The cloud
computing users would want not only the secrecy and integrity of their data guaranteed,
but also their access patterns to be hidden. For instance, if a stock-market database
is queried many times for the value of a certain stock, knowing the access frequencies
may inadvertently affect their prices, which is an undesirable outcome. Hence, Private
Information Retrieval (PIR) is introduced as a solution to this problem. PIR essentially
enables the user to access one of its files without the server learning the requested file.
Formally, a client that wants to retrieve fx from a remote server storing a database
F = (f0, f1, . . . , fn−1), fx ∈ F , can accomplish this without revealing neither x nor fx
to the server using a PIR protocol.
The trivial solution to this problem would be the client downloading the whole
database and selecting fx among them. This would not be possible if the user had re-
strictions about the files it could access, which is the case for oblivious transfer, a similar
concept in cryptographic literature [30]. Therefore, the fundamental requirement for
an efficient PIR is a sublinear communication rate. In other words, the data exchanged
between the client and the server must be asymptotically less than the database size.
The concept of private information retrieval first introduced by Chor et. al. in
1995 [6], and received serious attention. Afterwards, Computational PIR (CPIR), which
bases the security of the protocol on a computationally difficult problem, is presented
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in 1997 again by Chor [7]. There is also Information-Theoretic PIR (itPIR), which
preserves the security of the client against computationally unbound servers. However,
Chor et. al. proved that if the database is stored only in one server without any repli-
cation, the best itPIR protocol is the trivial one [6]. Therefore information theoretic
security can only be achieved efficiently if there are more than one non-communicating
servers. Contrarily, CPIR does not require such a replication as proved by Kushilevitz
and Ostrovsky [19]. On the grounds of this information, this thesis is mainly inter-
ested in efficient single-server computational PIR protocols, thus PIR will imply CPIR
henceforth.
CPIR protocols generally rely on the security of the underlying encryption scheme,
therefore each of them employs a different computationally-difficult problem. In 1997,
Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky suggested a CPIR scheme [19], utilizing Goldwasser-Micali
public key cryptosystem [16], thus depending on the intractability of quadratic residu-
osity problem. Later, in 1999, the first polylogarithmic communication rated CPIR is
presented by Cachin et. al., based on the number theoretic φ-hiding assumption, which
is also introduced in the same paper [5]. There exist several other schemes based on
lattice problems such as the ones constructed by Aguilar-Melchor and Gaborit [23,24],
or NTRU based protocol by Doroz, Sunar and Hammouri [10]. Furthermore, with the
current interest and development in fully homomorphic encryption systems, there are
some recent PIR schemes based on them [13, 35]. In addition to all these protocols,
Lipmaa presented a scheme that combines a non-cryptographic data type, binary de-
cision diagrams, and a probabilistic, additively homomorphic public key cryptosystem,
Damg˚ard-Jurik, into a bandwidth efficient protocol called BddCpir [20]. The secu-
rity of BddCpir is also based on the same security assumption as the Damg˚ard-Jurik
cryptosystem, namely the complexity of the well studied decisional composite residu-
osity problem [9]. Many of the aforementioned schemes provide efficient techniques to
speed up the server computation, but fail to provide a reasonable bandwidth perfor-
mance [10,23,24]. On the other hand, Lipmaa’s BddCpir is not one of the best schemes
in terms of computational complexity.
Therefore, we offer the application of quadratic and octal trees, instead of binary
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ones, to improve the BddCpir protocol in terms of computational complexity, while pre-
serving the bandwidth efficiency. Afterwards, we define some non-trivial parallelization
algorithms to utilize modern multi-core processors for further enhancement in server-
side computations.
In particular, this work first starts by defining preliminary information such as ho-
momorphic encryption, binary decision diagrams, Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem and
Lipmaa’s BddCpir in Chapter 2. Then, in Chapter 3, the properties that we aim to
achieve in our improved methods are listed, thus stating the problem definition. Chap-
ter 4 explains how quadratic and octal trees can be utilized in a PIR protocol, and
shows the client is still able to correctly retrieve its requested data item. After defin-
ing the necessary protocols, Chapter 5 illustrates how they can utilize parallelization
techniques to improve the overall computational complexity. In Chapter 6, a scalable
CPIR is presented for databases with high number of data items. Once our methods
are proposed, their analysis is presented in Chapter 7 in terms of both communication
and computational complexities. To support our claims in the analysis part, Chapter
8 presents the implementation results and actual execution times of both our methods
and BddCpir. Lastly, we compare the proposed schemes with similar protocols in the
literature in Chapter 9 and conclude the thesis in Chapter 10.
3
2 Background Work
As it has been introduced in the first section, our proposed PIR scheme is based on
Lipmaa’s BddCpir protocol [21]. Therefore, in order to start defining our improvements,
we first need to explain this protocol. BddCpir enables the client to query a server
with a database of n files and be able to privately retrieve 1 file out of n. Therefore,
(n, 1) CPIR notation is also employed for this scheme and it will be more frequently
used throughout this document.
(n, 1) CPIR is based on Binary Decision Diagrams (often abbreviated as BDD),
utilizes a more primitive (2, 1) CPIR scheme and requires a cryptosystem with spe-
cific properties. Particularly, the requirements state that it should be an additively
homomorphic, length-flexible public key cryptosystem with randomized key generation
and encryption algorithms [21]. Therefore, we will start by defining homomorphic ecn-
ryption and then we will move on to Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem which satisfies the
specified conditions.
After outlining the cryptosystem, we will continue with BDDs and demonstrate
how they are used to store data in a server. In that subsection the preliminaries of our
quadratic and octal tree methods are also given.
Once the preliminary data structures and encryption system are described, we can
continue with (2, 1) CPIR, the basic scheme that is used to retrieve 1 file out of 2 files
that are stored in the server. Since there are only 2 files in this case, the client will send
1 (encrypted) selection bit to select one of the two files and we will show how the server
returns the selected file correctly without decrypting the selection bit. After that, we
will show how to extend the (2, 1) CPIR into a generic (n, 1) scheme while still using
the same structures and protocols as the building blocks.
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2.1 Cryptographic Properties
BddCpir protocol and our improved version of it both function because of the un-
derlying properties of the cryptosystem used. Both BddCpir and our scheme share
the same probabilistic public key cryptographic protocol, proposed by Damg˚ard and
Jurik [9], because of its multiple encryption and additive homomorphism properties.
Therefore we will start by defining homomorphic encryption. After this definition,
Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem, its key generation, encryption and decryption operations
will follow. In addition, there will be a proof of how Damg˚ard-Jurik satisfies the additive
homomorphism requirement.
2.1.1 Homomorphic Encryption
Encryption systems that allow operations to be performed on encrypted data (cipher
text) without decrypting it are said to be homomorphic cryptosystems. In this way,
a user does not need to know the private key to be able to perform calculations on
encrypted data. This allows us to make use of powerful but not fully trusted systems
(e.g. cloud servers) to compute costly operations on our data instead of client computers
with limited resources.
More formally, an encryption is homomorphic if using known E(x) and E(y) it is
possible to compute E(f(x, y)) without using private key [33]. In this context E is the
encryption function and f can be +,× or ⊕. If f is an addition function, in other
words, if the cryptosystem allows summation over encrypted text, then the algorithm
is called additive homomorphic encryption. Examples of such cryptosystems include
Paillier [29], Goldwasser-Micali [16] and Damg˚ard-Jurik [9]. Similarly, if multiplication
can be calculated using ciphertext, thenf the algorithm is referred as multiplicative
homomorphic encryption. RSA [1] and ElGamal [11] are among the examples of such
systems. There are also fully homomorphic cryptosystems that allow both addition and
multiplication over the ciphertext.
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2.1.2 Damg˚ard-Jurik Cryptosystem
As we defined in our cryptographic requirements, additive homomorphism is a must
have property. The example cryptosystems that are given in the previous section, such
as Paillier, can be used in basic (2, 1) BddCpir construction which includes only one
encryption [20,29]. However using Paillier, we cannot extend the protocol to generalized
(n, 1) case since Paillier does not allow to adjust the block length of the scheme after
the public key has been generated. Therefore, Damg˚ard-Jurik, which is a generalization
of Paillier scheme [9], is the cryptosystem of choice for our protocols.
Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem uses the RSA setting, where the modulo arithmetic
is employed with a modulus N , which is the product of two sufficiently large prime
numbers, p and q. However it differs from RSA in its security principal; RSA relies on
the computational difficulty of factorization of large integers, whereas the security of
Damg˚ard-Jurik is based on the decisional composite residuosity problem, which is also
used in the original Paillier cryptosystem [29].
A very important part of this cryptosystem is the natural number s. First of all,
the Paillier scheme is a special case of Damg˚ard-Jurik where s is set to 1. Therefore
incrementing s will allow the block length of the scheme to be changed, thus allowing us
to encrypt the same data more than once. In other words, in Damg˚ard-Jurik, encryption
of an already encrypted file is possible by altering the s value. In the BddCpir protocols,
we will start by setting s to 1 at the lowest level of the tree, and we will increment it
by one as we advance upwards in the tree.
Key generation In order to generate the keys, the security parameter k needs to be
set first.
N of length k bits is an RSA modulus and it is generated as N = pq where p and q
are two large primes.
The other public key, also referred as the base, g ∈ Z∗Ns+1 is chosen such that
g = (1+N)jx mod N s+1 with a known j that is relatively prime to N and x ∈ H where
H is isomorphic to Z∗N . In our implementation, we use the simplification suggested by
the creators of the cryptosystem [9] and take g as simply N + 1.
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For private key, first λ, the least common multiple of p− 1 and q − 1 is computed:
λ = lcm(p− 1, q− 1). Then using Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), the private key
d is chosen such that
d = 1 mod N s and d = 0 mod λ.
Using the above procedures, public keys N, g and private key d are generated.
Encryption Given a plaintext m ∈ ZNs ; random r ∈ Z∗Ns+1 is chosen and ciphertext
is computed as
E(m, r) = gmrN
s
mod N s+1.
Decryption Given a ciphertext c, first cd mod N s+1 is computed. Then by using
the algorithm defined by [9], we can obtain m. More detail about the algorithm and
decryption process in general can be found in [9].
Additive homomorphism Given ciphertexts E(m1) and E(m2),
E(m1) · E(m2) = gm1 rNs1 · gm2 rN
s
2 mod N
s+1
= g(m1+m2)(r1r2)
Ns mod N s+1
= g(m1+m2)rN
s
mod N s+1
E(m1) · E(m2) = E(m1 +m2)
We can safely say that the above homomorphic property holds since r1r2 is equialent
to another random number r ∈ Z∗Ns+1. Similarly, Damg˚ard-Jurik also satisfies the
following equation provided that c is a natural number:
E(m)c = E(m · c)
Because of the properties given above, Damg˚ard-Jurik is an additively homomorphic
encryption system.
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2.2 Binary Decision Diagrams
A binary decision diagram is a directed acyclic graph where each node of the diagram
can have at most two outgoing transitions as in binary tree. The underlying graphs of
the decision diagrams that we use in our protocol always have tree properties, therefore
in this context BDDs can also be thought as trees.
2.2.1 Properties of a BDD
In a binary decision diagram, non-sink (also called non-terminal) nodes are labeled
as Ri,j where i denotes the level in the tree and j denotes the position of the node
in a level. The initial value of index i is 0 at the terminal nodes and it increases as
we approach the root node (in upwards direction). Likewise, j index starts with 0 at
leftmost node and increases while going right at a level. Besides nodes, the two outgoing
edges of the internal nodes are also labeled as 0 and 1, respectively.
The sink nodes can either be represented with R0,j or fj , since in BddCpir protocol,
those nodes hold the actual data items (files) of the database. In this work, we employ
both of the notations as appropriate for the context. The index j of fj (or R0,j) has the
bit length of m, representing the route taken from the root node to that sink node. In
other words, the indices of the data items are the concatenation of the labels of the edges
that are visited while reaching the sink node from the root node. Therefore their bit
length, m, is equal to the depth of the tree. Since illustrating the indices as bit strings
requires more space and they are harder to handle, we use their decimal equivalents in
j index for convenience. Figure 1 illustrates the aforementioned properties on a binary
decision diagram with 4 sink nodes and thus having a depth of 2.
As mentioned, in BddCpir protocol, the sink nodes represent the data items stored
in the server to be privately retrieved by the client. Thus, the labels of the sink nodes
are used to identify the indices of data items. Therefore if the client queries the server
with a binary input x of bit length m, the server returns the data item fx, stored in
the sink node with the label x. While processing the user input to return the requested
data item, the server stores the intermediate values at non-sink nodes Ri,j , where i > 0.
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R2,0
R1,1
f3f2
0 1
R1,0
f1f0
0 1
0 1
Figure 1: An example BDD constructed by server, shows the case where the client
queries the database with binary input x = 10, to retrieve file f2.
2.2.2 Quadratic and Octal Trees
For performance reasons, which will be explained in depth later in subsequent sec-
tions, we propose using quadratic and octal trees instead of binary decision diagrams.
These types of trees essentially have the same properties as the binary ones except their
child count.
Quadratic Trees If the non-sink nodes of a tree has 4 children, it is called quadratic
tree or occasionally quadtree. The outgoing edges of the internal (non-sink) nodes in
a quadratic tree are labeled as {00, 01, 10, 11}, therefore the labels of the sink nodes
have 2m bit strings where m is the depth of the tree.
Octal Trees Octal Trees, which are sometimes called octrees, have 8 children in their
non-sink nodes. The outgoing edges of those nodes are labeled by 3-bit strings {000,
001, 010, . . . , 111}, hence the sink nodes’ label strings have bit length of 3m, where m
is again the depth of the tree.
2.3 (2, 1) CPIR
In 2005, Lipmaa proposed a communication-effective (2, 1) CPIR protocol [20],
which is a basic cryptographic primitive that only allows 1 file to be retrieved from a
2-file setting. In this 1-out-of-2 protocol, the server has a database F = (f0, f1) where
files have ℓ bit length, more formally fi ∈ {0, 1}ℓ. Since there are only two files, to
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retrieve fx from the server, a client should input either 0 or 1, so x ∈ {0, 1}. The
protocol works in three steps:
1. Client generates public and secret keys (pk, sk), computes c = Epk(x) and sends
(pk, c) to the server.
2. Server computes R = Epk(f0) · cf1−f0 and sends R to the client.
3. Client computes Dsk(R) to find fx.
Epk(x) will be referenced as simply E(x) and Dsk(R) as D(R) henceforth, since
encryption and decryption are always performed using public and private keys, respec-
tively.
Proof. Since we have already shown that our cryptosystem is additively-homomorphic,
we can also show that client will get fx after decryption as follows
R = E (f0) · c f1−f0
= E (f0) · E (x) f1−f0
= E (f0 + x (f1 − f0))
= E (fx).
2.4 (n, 1) CPIR
Again in [20], Lipmaa proposes a more generalized (n, 1) CPIR using (2, 1) CPIR
and binary decision diagrams as building blocks. To extend the primitive protocol to
n-file databases, (2, 1) CPIR must be repeatedly applied to 2-file subtrees. Specifically,
the protocol will start processing from the sink nodes, continue in a bottom-up manner
and stop at the root node. While going up in the tree, two data items are processed
into one by using the second step of (2, 1) CPIR described in Section 2.3, and the result
of this calculation is stored in an upper level node. When all the items in a level are
processed, the protocol continues with the elements in the proceeding level until there
is no upper level. After the calculation is finished, the ciphertext stored in the root
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node of the tree must be sent to the client that will decrypt it to reach the content of
the file it requested.
In this 1-out-of-n protocol, the server has a database F = (f0, f1, ..., fn−1) with n ℓ-
bit files, fi ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, fi ∈ F . To retrieve a file fx from the database F , the client sends
encrypted version of the input x. Namely, for input x = (x0, . . . , xm−1), xi ∈ {0, 1},
the client sends C = (c0, . . . , cm−1), where each ci = E(xi), and m is the depth of the
tree, m = ⌈log2(n)⌉. At the end of the protocol, the client gets fx by decrypting the
ciphertext m times.
Example 1. To illustrate, let us consider a case where the server has 4 files to be chosen
from and these files are stored in the sink nodes of a binary decision diagram. Data
items are F = {f0, f1, f2, f3} and client inputs are x = (x0, x1). First, client computes
and sends c0 = E(x0), c1 = E(x1). Upon receiving those inputs, server computes the
following on the first (lowermost) level:
R1,0 = E (f0) · c f1−f00 ,
R1,1 = E (f2) · c f3−f20
As described in Section 2.2.1 and illustrated in Figure 1, R1,0 and R1,1 are second-
level nodes of the tree. After processing the first level, server then starts to work with
the ciphertexts obtained from the previous step as
R2,0 = E (R0) · cR1−R01 .
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Different from the previous step, the other selection bit c1 is used, as appropriate
for the level. The computation of the server stops at this point and sends R2,0 to
be decrypted by the client. Upon receiving the ciphertext, client needs to perform the
decryption operation twice in order to obtain fx since R2,0 contains a double encryption
as shown below
R2,0 = E (R0) · cR1−R01
= E (R0 + c1 · (R1 − R0))
= E (E (f0x0) + c1 · (E (f1x0)−E (f0x0)))
= E (E (fx1x0))
The important point in this protocol is we need to make sure that every encryption,
exponentiation and multiplication operation is calculated on the correct modulus. At
the beginning, while starting from the raw data on the lowest level, the natural number
s used in Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem must be set to 1 since this will be the first
encryption. After that, in each level this s value will be incremented by 1, allowing
multiple encryptions. Besides encryption, all the other operations will also use N (s+1)
as their modulus, specified according to their level. Therefore the ci inputs sent by
the client also need to be computed on the correct modulus. Specifically, the least
significant bit of the input string should be encrypted with s = 1 (in other words,
using modulus N2), and the encryption of most significant bit should use s = m (i.e.
modNm+1) assuming the input is m bits long.
12
Example 2. In an 8-file binary tree system, the input bits will be formed by the user
as
c0 = g
x0rn0 mod N
2
c1 = g
x1rN
2
1 mod N
3
c2 = g
x2rN
3
2 mod N
4,
where r0 ∈R Z∗N2, r1 ∈R Z∗N3 , and r2 ∈R Z∗N3 and x = (x2, x1, x0) is the index of the
desired data item. The same moduli used by the client will also be used by the server
in the respective levels of the tree.
Therefore, considering the quadratic complexity of Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption op-
eration, the computation latency will be inevitably high even for databases with mod-
erately high number of items because of the constant increase in modulus. This contin-
uous message expansion with multiple encryptions hinders the scalability of the CPIR
scheme.
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3 Problem Statement
PIR protocols, by definition, should have an efficient communication complexity
compared to the trivial solution. This property differentiates PIR protocols from obliv-
ious transfer schemes that have higher bandwidth requirements [30]. Since in oblivious
transfer, the user is allowed to access only one item in the database, the removal of this
requirement in PIR allows more communication-efficient protocols to be constructed.
However, communication is not the only restriction in PIR. The server-side compu-
tation must also be reasonable so that a user can prefer utilizing a PIR scheme instead
of the naive solution of downloading the whole database. Because of these reasons, we
aim to achieve two major performance measures to obtain an efficient PIR protocol:
 Computational Efficiency and Scalability Since at the core of the PIR pro-
tocols there lies particularly costly cryptographic operations, such as encryption,
multiplication and exponentiation of both plaintext as well as encrypted data,
computational complexity is an important measure for the PIR schemes. The
efficiency is generally based on the throughput metric, expressed as the number
of data items processed in a unit time. Besides that, the latency is also significant
since the users would only tolerate waiting for a limited amount of time. Apart
from the latency and throughput requirements, an efficient PIR protocol should
also be scalable. Namely, even if the number of data items in the database grows,
the scheme must remain applicable. PIR schemes with parallelizable methods will
have an advantage for the scalability requirement, since they allow the distribu-
tion of the work onto different cores. Therefore, in this work we try to benefit
from parallelization of costly computations.
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 Bandwidth Efficiency As the requirement for any PIR scheme, the commu-
nication complexity must be strictly smaller than the database size. The com-
munication cost consists of both query and response size, sent by the client and
the server respectively. While some of the PIR schemes focus on minimizing the
amount of bits in the query sent by the client to the server, others devote their
efforts to decrease the response length sent from the server to the client. In this
thesis, we are not separating them from each other and aim to optimize the total
bandwidth exhausted by both the client and the server.
As a consequence, the main aim of this work is to outperform the original BddCpir
in terms of both computational and bandwidth efficiency. In the subsequent chapters,
we explain our methods to achieve this goal.
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4 CPIR using Quadratic and Octal Trees
The underlying data structure of BddCpir has a significant effect on the computa-
tional complexity of the protocol because of the message expansion caused by multiple
encryptions. Since we need to increase the natural number s on each level of the binary
tree used in BddCpir, the modulus which we use in our modular arithmetic operations
constantly increases, and consequently resulting in unacceptable latencies on databases
with high number of files, as demonstrated by our experiments in Chapter 8. Con-
sidering the main factor in this increase, namely the depth of the tree, we focus on
decreasing the depth of the tree while preserving the number of items in a database.
For this purpose, we change the data structure used for storing the files in BddCpir
from binary to quadratic and octal trees. With the increase in the number of children
a node can have, the depth of the tree decreases, thus resulting in reduced computa-
tional complexity. In this section, we will explain how the CPIR protocols work with
quadratic and octal trees comprehensively.
4.1 Utilizing Quadratic Trees in CPIR
In a quadratic tree, each non-sink node has four children as described in Section
2.2.2. Similar to the binary case, the files are stored in the sink nodes of the tree, and
the protocol processes the tree in a bottom-up manner. Let us first define the primitive
(4, 1) CPIR used with a quadratic tree and then proceed to the generalization of this
basic scheme to (n, 1) case.
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4.1.1 (4, 1) CPIR
(4, 1) CPIR is a 1-out-of-4 protocol that uses a minimal quadratic tree with 4 sink
nodes and a root node. In this scheme, the server holds a database of four files of bit
length ℓ, F = (f0, f1, f2, f3), fi ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, one of which is to be picked for retrieval by
the user. In order to retrieve fx from the server, a client determines the input bits
x = (x1x0) beforehand, and sends E(x1 · x0) in addition to E(x1) and E(x0). Although
the additional encrypted index bit may seem to increase the communication complexity,
this protocol achieves an improvement in overall bandwidth usage as it will be presented
in Chapter 7 in detail.
Formally speaking, given a database F and input bits x, the protocol is executed
as follows:
1. Client:
 generates public and secret keys (pk, sk)
 computes C = {c0, c1, c0,1}: c0 = E(x0), c1 = E(x1), c0,1 = E(x1 · x0)
 sends (pk, C) to the server.
2. Server:
 computes R = E(f0) · c f1−f00 · c f2−f01 · c f3−f2−f1+f00,1
 sends R to the client.
3. Client computes Dsk(R) to find fx1x0 .
Proof. The following proof shows that client will obtain fx after decrypting R, based
on the fact that Damg˚ard-Jurik is an additively-homomorphic encryption:
R = E (f0) · c f1−f00 · c f2−f01 · c f3−f2−f1+f00,1
= E (f0) · E (x0) f1−f0 · E (x1) f2−f0 · E (x1 · x0) f3−f2−f1+f0
= E (f0 + x0 · (f1 − f0) + x1 · (f2 − f0) + x1 · x0 · (f3 − f2 − f1 + f0))
= E (x1 · x0 · f3 + x1 · (1− x0) · f2 + x0 · (1− x1) · f1 + (1− x1) · (1− x0) · f0)
= E (fx1x0) = E (fx)
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4.1.2 (n, 1) CPIR with Quadratic Trees
The new primitive (4, 1) CPIR can be generalized to n-file case using quadratic trees.
The generalization process is similar to the one from (2, 1) to (n, 1) case with binary
trees: client sends encrypted input bits to retrieve any desired file, server constructs
a tree from database that holds the files at its sink nodes, and processes the tree in a
bottom-up manner using (4, 1) CPIR repeatedly, then returns the final ciphertext that
is stored at the root node of the tree. Client accesses the requested file by decrypting
the ciphertext for number of times equal to the depth of the tree.
Assuming that the number of data items n is an exact power of 4, i.e. n = 4m, the
quadratic tree will have a depth of m. In order to retrieve a file from this database,
client has to decide 2m input bits x = (x0, x1, x2, . . . , x2m−1). After determining the
input bits, client computes E(x2i), E(x2i+1) and E(x2i · x2i+1) for each level of the tree
i = 0, . . . , m − 1. The significant factor in this operation is that the modulus used for
each level of the tree should be different, namely, both client and server encryptions
should be performed on mod N s+1, where s = i+1 for level i of the tree. To imply the
number s used in the modulus during encryptions, we use E(s)(x) notation for arbitrary
x. If no s is present, s = 1, i.e. mod N2 is presumed. In summary, given F of n = 4m
files and input bits x, (n, 1) CPIR protocol with quadratic trees works as follows:
1. Client:
 sets public and secret keys (pk, sk)
 computes C:
for s = 1, . . . , m,
c2s−2 = E
(s)(x2s−2), c2s−1 = E
(s)(x2s−1), c2s−2,2s−1 = E
(s)(x2s−2 · x2s−1)
 sends (pk, C), to the server.
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2. Server:
 for j = 0, 1, . . . , 4m − 1, set R0,j = fj
 for s = 1, . . . , m and j = 0, 1, . . . , 4m−s − 1
Rs,j =E
(s)(Rs−1,4j) · (c2s−2)Rs−1,4j+1−Rs−1,4j · (c2s−1)Rs−1,4j+2−Rs−1,4j
· (c2s−2,2s−1)Rs−1,4j+3−Rs−1,4j+2−Rs−1,4j+1+Rs−1,4j
 sends Rm,0 to the client.
3. Client computes D(Rm,0) m times in order to retrieve fx.
In Figure 2, an example quadratic tree is shown, which is constructed by the server
for a 16 file database. To illustrate, R1,0 will hold the processed version of f0, f1, f2, f3
according to step 2.2 of the protocol with s = 1, namely on modulus N2. Likewise, after
calculating R1,1, R1,2 and R1,3 in the same manner with respective files, R2,0 will be
calculated with R1,0, R1,1, R1,2 and R1,3 using the same formulation with s = 2 (using
modulus N3). When reached to the root of the tree, in this case the node labeled
R2,0, the server stops calculation and returns the ciphertext held by that node. Since
the depth of this example tree is 2, upon receiving the ciphertext, the client needs to
decrypt it twice: first by using s = 2 and then the resulting ciphertext with s = 1.
R2,0
R1,3
f15f14f13f12
R1,2
f11f10f9f8
R1,1
f7f6f5f4
R1,0
f3f2f1f0
00 01 10 11
Figure 2: A depth-2 quadratic tree implementing (16,1)-CPIR
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4.2 Utilizing Octal Trees
The non-sink nodes of the octal trees have 8 children as explained in Section 2.2.2.
This property helps us to further reduce the depth of the tree for the same amount
of files in a database, without adversely effecting the bandwidth usage. Similarly to
the binary and quadratic case, the server again holds the files in the sink nodes of the
tree and all the calculated intermediate values in the non-sink nodes of the tree. This
chapter first defines the basic 1-out-of-8 CPIR protocol and then shows how it can be
generalized into 1-out-of-n case using octal trees.
4.2.1 (8, 1) CPIR
This protocol is the equivalent of (2, 1) CPIR for the octal tree case. In this primitive
scheme, we assume there are 8 files in the server and the client queries it to retrieve
one of them. Specifically, the server keeps a database F = (f0, f1, . . . , f7), with each
file having ℓ-bit length, fi ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, and the client wants to obtain the file fx, where
x = (x2x1x0) where xi ∈ {0, 1}. Given the database F and input bits x, the (8, 1) CPIR
works as follows:
1. Client:
 generates public and secret keys (pk, sk)
 computes C: c0 = E(x0),c1 = E(x1), c2 = E(x2), c0,1 = E(x0 · x1),
c0,2 = E(x0 · x2), c1,2 = E(x1 · x2), c0,1,2 = E(x0 · x1 · x2)
 sends (pk, C) to the server.
2. Server computes
R = E(f0) · c f1−f00 · c f2−f01 · c f4−f02 · c f3−f2−f1+f00,1 · c f5−f4−f1+f00,2
· c f6−f4−f2+f01,2 · c f7−f6−f5+f4−f3+f2+f1−f00,1,2
and sends R to the client.
3. Client computes Dsk(R) to find fx, where x = x2x1x0.
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Proof. Utilizing the property of additive homomorphism in the underlying cryptosys-
tem, we can show that the computation of R yields to the encryption of the client-
requested file.
R = E (f0) · c f1−f00 · c f2−f01 · c f4−f02 · c f3−f2−f1+f00,1 · c f5−f4−f1+f00,2 · c f6−f4−f2+f01,2
· c f7−f6−f5+f4−f3+f2+f1−f00,1,2
= E (f0) · E (x0) f1−f0 · E (x1) f2−f0 · E (x2) f4−f0
·E (x1 · x0) f3−f2−f1+f0 · E (x2 · x0) f5−f4−f1+f0 · E (x2 · x1) f6−f4−f2+f0
·E (x2 · x1 · x0) f7−f6−f5+f4−f3+f2+f1−f0
= E (f0 + x0 · (f1 − f0) + x1 · (f2 − f0) + x2 · (f4 − f0)
+ x1 · x0 · (f3 − f2 − f1 + f0) + x2 · x0 · (f5 − f4 − f1 + f0)
+ x2 · x1 · (f6 − f4 − f2 + f0)
+ x2 · x1 · x0 · (f7 − f6 − f5 + f4 − f3 + f2 + f1 − f0))
= E (x2 · x1 · x0 · f7 + x2 · x1 · (1− x0) · f6 + x2 · (1− x1) · x0 · f5
+ x2 · (1− x1) · (1− x0) · f4 + (1− x2) · x1 · x0 · f3 + (1− x2) · x1 · (1− x0) · f2
+ (1− x2) · (1− x1) · x0 · f1 + (1− x2) · (1− x1) · (1− x0) · f0)
= E (fx) = E (fx2x1x0).
4.2.2 (n, 1) CPIR with Octal Trees
The generalization of (8, 1) CPIR to (n, 1) CPIR with octal trees is quite similar
to those in the quadratic and binary cases. With a database of n = 8m files F , the
server constructs an octal tree of depth m. To query fx, the client has to determine m
input bits to be encrypted and sent. Different from the binary and quadratic cases, now
every level of the tree requires 3 input bits to be chosen and their encryptions are not
sufficient, particularly, the client has to obtain multiplication of their every combination
other and encrypt these bit combinations too, as in step 1.2 of (8, 1) CPIR protocol.
The need for sending 7 encrypted bits rather than 3 (which would be the case if we
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used quadratic tree instead) is the cost of using octal trees for a reduced depth. This
is also the reason why we stopped at 8-child trees instead of continuing with 16-child,
32-child, etc.. As it will be shown in Chapter 7 in detail, this is the highest number of
children we can use in the database without exceeding the bandwidth usage of original
BddCpir with binary trees for the database sizes we employed in our implementations.
Provided the database F of n = 8m files, and client input bits x, (n, 1) CPIR
protocol with octal trees will start processing the tree from bottom to up, and return
the resulting ciphertext at the root node to the client as follows:
1. Client:
 sets public and secret keys (pk, sk)
 computes C:
for s = 1, . . . , m
c3s−3 = E
(s)(x3s−3), c3s−2 = E
(s)(x3s−2), c3s−1 = E
(s)(x3s−1),
c3s−3,3s−2 = E
(s)(x3s−3 · x3s−2), c3s−3,3s−1 = E(s)(x3s−3 · x3s−1),
c3s−2,3s−1 = E
(s)(x3s−2 · x3s−1), c3s−3,3s−2,3s−1 = E(s)(x3s−3 · x3s−2 · x3s−1)
 sends (pk, C) to the server.
2. Server:
 for j = 0, 1, . . . , 8m − 1, set R0,j = fj
 for s = 1, . . . , m and j = 0, 1, . . . , 4m−s − 1
Rs,j = E
(s) (Rs−1,8j) · (c3s−3)Rs−1,8j+1−Rs−1,8j · (c3s−2)Rs−1,8j+2−Rs−1,8j
· (c3s−1)Rs−1,8j+4−Rs−1,8j · (c3s−3,3s−2)Rs−1,8j+3−Rs−1,8j+2−Rs−1,8j+1+Rs−1,8j
· (c3s−3,3s−1)Rs−1,8j+5−Rs−1,8j+4−Rs−1,8j+1+Rs−1,8j
· (c3s−2,3s−1)Rs−1,8j+6−Rs−1,8j+4−Rs−1,8j+2+Rs−1,8j
· c Rs−1,8j+7−Rs−1,8j+6−Rs−1,8j+5+Rs−1,8j+4−Rs−1,8j+3+Rs−1,8j+2+Rs−1,8j+1−Rs−1,8j3s−3,3s−2,3s−1
 sends Rm,0 to the client.
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3. Client computes D(s)(Rm,0) for s = m,m− 1, . . . , 1 to retrieve fx.
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5 Parallelization of CPIR
All of the protocols that we have defined in Chapter 4, or has been defined be-
fore by Lipmaa [21], have a substantial amount of repetitive computations that are
mostly independent from each other. Both the client-side and server-side computations
can benefit from parallelization since their costly encryption and modular exponentia-
tion operations can be operated separately by different threads. Thus, in this chapter
we specify how we utilize parallelization in CPIR protocols to improve computational
complexity and outline the proposed parallel algorithms.
Parallelization of the client side computations is rather trivial as outlined in the
Section 5.1. However, for the server side operations, we try three methods, where each
method includes an improvement over the preceding ones. We list each of them in order
to demonstrate our progress and explain our main parallelization method better.
5.1 Client Side Parallelization
The encryption of the input bits constitutes most of the client side computation.
The remaining part, repetitive decrypting, is serial in nature since each decryption
procedure works on the result of previous decryption. Therefore, we operate all the
encryptions done by the client in different threads, hence distributing the computation
onto all available cores.
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Implementation Details The algorithm for client side parallelization is pretty much
straightforward as can be observed in Algorithms 1, 2 and 3. There is only one minor
detail of the implementation; the iterations of the for loops are independent from each
other, however they do not consume the same amount of time since the encryptions on
each iteration use a different s thus operating on a distinct modulus. Therefore, in order
to optimize the utilization of processor cores and prevent them from being idle during
the execution of the longest encryption, we use dynamic scheduling for the iterations
of the for loop in step 1 of Algorithms 1, 2 and 3. OpenMP, the parallelization library
we are using in our implementation, allows such dynamic allocations by assigning an
iteration of the for loop to a thread as they become available, removing the need to wait
for other threads to complete their executions [25]. Dynamic scheduling is especially
useful for loops with iterations that have fluctuating amounts of work such as our client
side encryptions. However, the parallelization of step 2 in Algorithms 2 and 3 should
not be dynamic since the encryptions inside are expected to take up approximately the
same amount of time.
Algorithm 1 Parallel client side computation for binary tree based (n, 1) CPIR
Require: x = (xm−1xm−2 . . . x0), pk
Ensure: C
1: for s← 1 to m in parallel do
2: cs−1 ← E(s)(xs−1)
3: end parallel for
4: return C = {cm−1, cm−2, . . . , c0}
Algorithm 2 Parallel client side computation for quadratic tree based (n, 1) CPIR
Require: x = (x2m−1x2m−2 . . . x0), pk
Ensure: C
1: for s← 1 to m in parallel do
2: in parallel do
3: c2s−2 ← E(s)(x2s−2)
4: c2s−1 ← E(s)(x2s−1)
5: c2s−2,2s−1 ← E(s)(x2s−2 · x2s−1)
6: sync
7: end parallel for
8: return C
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Algorithm 3 Parallel client side computation for octal tree based (n, 1) CPIR
Require: x = (x3m−1x3m−2 . . . x0), pk
Ensure: C
1: for s← 1 to m in parallel do
2: in parallel do
3: c3s−3 ← E(s)(x3s−3)
4: c3s−2 ← E(s)(x3s−2)
5: c3s−1 ← E(s)(x3s−1)
6: c3s−3,3s−2 ← E(s)(x3s−3 · x3s−2)
7: c3s−3,3s−1 ← E(s)(x3s−3 · x3s−1)
8: c3s−2,3s−1 ← E(s)(x3s−2 · x3s−1)
9: c3s−3,3s−2,3s−1 ← E(s)(x3s−3 · x3s−2 · x3s−1)
10: sync
11: end parallel for
12: return C
5.2 Server Side Trivial Parallelization Algorithm
For the server side computations, the first parallelization method we try is the most
straightforward one. Since all the base protocols executed on a level of the tree are
independent from each other, their parallelization is almost embarrassingly parallel [34].
On the start of the processing of a level, we assign all the independent executions
of primitive computations (e.g., encryprions and modular exponentations) to distinct
threads, and wait for them to be completed. Note that in this method, all the threads
spawned in a level have to be completely finished before we can proceed to the next
level of the tree. Although all the protocols in a level will be operating on different files,
they are expected to take approximately same time. Therefore provided that there are
adequate number of cores to work on and the server has a reasonable workload, the idle
time before proceeding to next level should be minimal.
There is no restriction about data structure to be used, in other words all binary,
quadratic and octal tree implementations of (n, 1) CPIR can be parallelized using this
trivial method. The parallelization methods for binary, quadratic and octal based server
systems are shown in the Algorithm 4, 5, 6 respectively.
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Algorithm 4 Parallel server computation for binary (n,1) CPIR v1
Require: C: m encrypted input bits
Ensure: Rm,0
1: for s← 1 to m do
2: for j ← 0 to 2m−s − 1 in parallel do
3: t0 ← Rs−1,2j
4: t1 ← Rs−1,2j+1
5: Rs,j ← E(s)(t0) · (cs−1)t1−t0 mod N s+1
6: end parallel for
7: end for
8: return Rm,0
Algorithm 5 Parallel server computation for quadratic (n,1) CPIR v1
Require: C: 3m encrypted input bits
Ensure: Rm,0
1: for s← 1 to m do
2: for j ← 0 to 4m−s − 1 in parallel do
3: for k ← 0 to 3 do
4: tk ← Rs−1,2j+k
5: end for
6: Rs,j ← E(s)(t0) · (c2s−2)t1−t0 · (c2s−1)t2−t0 · (c2s−2,2s−1)t3−t2−t1+t0 mod N s+1
7: end parallel for
8: end for
9: return Rm,0
Algorithm 6 Parallel server computation for octal (n,1) CPIR v1
Require: C: 7m encrypted input bits
Ensure: Rm,0
1: for s← 1 to m do
2: for j ← 0 to 8m−s − 1 in parallel do
3: for k ← 0 to 7 do
4: tk ← Rs−1,2j+k
5: end for
6: Rs,j ← E(s)(t0) · (c3s−3)t1−t0 · (c3s−2)t2−t0 · (c3s−1)t4−t0 · (c3s−3,3s−2)t3−t2−t1+t0
·(c3s−3,3s−1)t5−t4−t1+t0 · (c3s−2,3s−1)t6−t4−t2+t0
·(c3s−3,3s−2,3s−1)t7−t6−t5+t4−t3+t2+t1−t0 mod N s+1
7: end parallel for
8: end for
9: return Rm,0
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5.3 Server Side Two-Degree Parallelization Algorithm
Two-degree parallelization method is the second algorithm we try as an improvement
over the first one described in the previous section. Again, it relies on the independency
of costly operations performed in a level of the tree being processed by the server.
As it can be observed from the previous algorithms, the calculations for the upper
node ciphertexts include an encryption and varying number of modular exponentiations
depending on the tree used. Since each of these calculations are independent from each
other, we can process all of them in different threads, and synchronize to calculate the
upper tree node by multiplying them using the corresponding modulus of the level.
This method further divides the costly computations performed in a level and ben-
efits multi-core systems in a greater extend. As in the previous method, the threads
created at a level have to be completely finished before advancing on the next level.
Although this method better splits the work done on a level into pieces, the synchro-
nization cost will be higher since numerous threads will be created, especially at the
lowermost levels of the tree.
Similar to the prior method, this parallelization can be applied to binary, quadratic
and octal tree based (n, 1) CPIR as shown in Algorithm 7, 8 and 9 respectively.
Algorithm 7 Parallel server computation for binary (n,1) CPIR v2
Require: C: m encrypted input bits
Ensure: Rm,0
1: for s← 1 to m do
2: for j ← 0 to 2m−s − 1 in parallel do
3: t0 ← Rs−1,2j
4: t1 ← Rs−1,2j+1
5: in parallel do
6: q0 ← E(s)(t0)
7: q1 ← (cs−1)t1−t0 mod N s+1
8: sync
9: Rs,j ← q0 · q1 mod N s+1
10: end parallel for
11: end for
12: return Rm,0
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Algorithm 8 Parallel server computation for quadratic (n,1) CPIR v2
Require: C: 3m encrypted input bits
Ensure: Rm,0
1: for s← 1 to m do
2: for j ← 0 to 4m−s − 1 in parallel do
3: for k ← 0 to 3 do
4: tk ← Rs−1,2j+k
5: end for
6: in parallel do
7: q0 ← E(s)(t0)
8: q1 ← (c2s−2)t1−t0 mod N s+1
9: q2 ← (c2s−1)t2−t0 mod N s+1
10: q3 ← (c2s−2,2s−1)t3−t2−t1+t0 mod N s+1
11: sync
12: Rs,j = q0
13: for k ← 1 to 3 do
14: Rs,j ∗= qk mod N s+1
15: end for
16: end parallel for
17: end for
18: return Rm,0
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Algorithm 9 Parallel server computation for octal (n,1) CPIR v2
Require: C: 7m encrypted input bits
Ensure: Rm,0
1: for s← 1 to m do
2: for j ← 0 to 8m−s − 1 in parallel do
3: for k ← 0 to 7 do
4: tk ← Rs−1,2j+k
5: end for
6: in parallel do
7: q0 ← E(s)(t0)
8: q1 ← (c3s−3)t1−t0 mod N s+1
9: q2 ← (c3s−2)t2−t0 mod N s+1
10: q3 ← (c3s−1)t4−t0 mod N s+1
11: q4 ← (c3s−3,3s−2)t3−t2−t1+t0 mod N s+1
12: q5 ← (c3s−3,3s−1)t5−t4−t1+t0 mod N s+1
13: q6 ← (c3s−2,3s−1)t6−t4−t2+t0 mod N s+1
14: q7 ← (c3s−3,3s−2,3s−1)t7−t6−t5+t4−t3+t2+t1−t0 mod N s+1
15: sync
16: Rs,j = q0
17: for k ← 1 to 7 do
18: Rs,j ∗= qk mod N s+1
19: end for
20: end parallel for
21: end for
22: return Rm,0
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5.4 Server Side Core-Isolated Parallelization
The previous methods for server side parallelization are level-bound, meaning that
they have to synchronize the threads created on each level of the tree before continuing.
This property both introduces high synchronization overheads and also brings the pos-
sibility for some cores to stay idle during the computation due unbalanced workload of
each thread. For this reason, in order to reduce synchronization points between cores,
we propose our main parallelization method, where we isolate the tree onto available
cores.
Main principle of this method is dividing the tree into as many subtrees as the
number of available cores and having them calculate their assigned subtrees separately.
Naturally, after each core finishes its part, a synchronization is necessary. After the
integration of their calculations via synchronization, the remaining part of the tree is
processed as in second parallelization method depicted in Section 5.3.
For example, provided that there are 2κ number of available cores and n = 2m files
in a server implementing (n, 1) CPIR with binary trees and n > κ, each core will have
to process 2m−κ files in isolation using the original scheme without any parallelization
inside for a tree of m − κ levels. Specifically, for m − κ levels, the cores do not need
to communicate in any manner. After the cores finish computing their portion of the
tree, they have to synchronize and continue processing remaining κ levels concurrently.
This algorithm is able to operate on quadtree and octree based (n, 1) CPIR protocols
as well, and the files in those trees will be separated into cores in a similar manner.
The algorithm implementing this method for binary (n, 1) CPIR is described in
Algorithm 10. The isolated work of the cores can be identified in pseudocode statements
between the lines 2-8 whereas the concurrent work after synchronization lies between
lines 11-21.
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Algorithm 10 Parallel server computation for binary (n,1) CPIR v3
Require: C: m encrypted input bits, F = {f0, . . . , f2m−1} 2κ: number of cores, κ < m
Ensure: Rm,0
1: for p← 0 to 2κ − 1 in parallel do ⊲ cores work in isolation
2: for s← 1 to m− κ do
3: for j ← 0 to 2m−s − 1 do
4: t0 ← Rs−1,2·j·p
5: t1 ← Rs−1,2·j·p+1
6: Rs,j·p ← E(s)(t0) · (cs−1)t1−t0 mod N s+1
7: end for
8: end for
9: end parallel for
⊲ cores sync and continue with the rest of the tree concurrently
10: for s← m− κ+ 1 to m do
11: for j ← 0 to 2m−s − 1 in parallel do
12: t0 ← Rs−1,2j
13: t1 ← Rs−1,2j+1
14: in parallel do
15: q0 ← E(s)(t0)
16: q1 ← (cs−1)t1−t0 mod N s+1
17: sync
18: Rs,j ← q0 · q1 mod N s+1
19: end parallel for
20: end for
21: return Rm,0
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6 Scalable CPIR for Parallel Implementations
The proposed parallelization method improves computation efficiency of the server
notably, however, if the database starts to have higher number of files, then CPIR will
not be able to handle those files efficiently due to the increased depth of the tree. In
other words, the system will not be able to scale adequately, even with the help of
the aforementioned parallelization approach, since with the increased number of files,
the database tree will get deeper, increasing the size of the modulus and making the
encryption and exponentiation processes more costly. Therefore, to achieve scalability,
which is a must have property of an efficient CPIR as defined in Chapter 3, we propose
a modified version of CPIR that takes advantage of parallel processing, and allows the
scheme to scale to large number of data items provided that many-core processors are
available.
The scalable method for CPIR is based on holding the whole database in separated,
manageable-sized subtrees instead of one big tree, and collapsing them into one subtree
upon receiving a request from the client and then operating on that subtree. For
this reason, obviously the client has to send different number of selection bits from
the normal CPIR schemes. Since a subtree will have fewer number of items than the
database size, the depth of the tree will be reduced, giving us a considerable amount of
bandwidth gain. However, in contrast, to choose between possible subtrees, the client
will have to send additional encrypted selection bits. With careful selection of subtree
sizes, we can obtain speedup without too much adverse affect on the bandwidth. The
exact analysis of this method in terms of bandwidth and computation costs will also
be given in Chapter 7.
The details of the scalable method are demonstrated in Algorithms 11 and 12.
33
Specifically, Algorithm 11 illustrates the client computations and Algorithm 12 describes
the steps executed by the server process.
First of all, the subtree size and the number of subtrees must be decided and known
by both server and client. Specifically, considering a binary-tree based database with
n = 2m files, if the number of items in a subtree is 2l, with l < m, that gives us the
number of subtrees in a system as µ = 2m−l. Number of subtrees, µ, must be selected
according to the performance requirements. The analyses at Chapter 7 and actual
results at Chapter 8 provide an insight about the selection of l and µ, and show us how
the selection affects the performance clearly.
After determining how many files a subtree will hold and calculating the number of
subtrees, the client may begin to query the server to get a file fx. In order to do so,
for the scalable CPIR, the client must decide both which subtree holds the requested
file and in that subtree, which file corresponds to fx, differently from the previous
schemes. The encrypted selection bits, denoted with ςi in Algorithm 11, are used to
indicate the selected subtree, whereas input bits, cj ∈ C are typical input bits to select
the file within a subtree, similar with the previous schemes. Specifically, if a subtree
contains the desired file, the client will encrypt 1 using the homomorphic Damg˚ard-
Jurik cryptosystem, and 0 otherwise. Since the depth of the tree is now reduced, the
client will have to encrypt l regular input bits for the binary tree case as shown in
Algorithm 11.
Upon receiving the selection bits ςi and input bits cj , the server starts the process by
collapsing all the subtrees into one. As shown in the steps between 1-10 in Algorithm
12, the server uses ςi to collapse the subtrees into one; and after the merge, it works on
the collapsed subtree as a regular tree.
The collapsing process includes a modular exponentiation for each file in the database,
as seen on the line 7 of Algorithm 12. After all the files have been raised to a power
of corresponding ς, they are all multiplied using the same modulus (with s = 1). Since
now the collapsed subtree contains encrypted files at the bottom, our regular, parallel
bottom-to-up processing will start with s = 2, and increments it while going up to
higher levels. The server splits the subtree into smaller parts, assigning each of them to
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Algorithm 11 Client-side computation for binary tree-based Scalable CPIR
Require: m, l, and x = xl−1 . . . x1, x0
Ensure: {c1, . . . , cl−1} and {ςi, . . . , ς2m−l−1}
1: µ← 2m−l
2: ζ ← xm−1, . . . , xl
3: for i← 0 to µ− 1 do
4: if i 6= ζ then
5: ςi ← E(0)
6: else
7: ςi ← E(1)
8: end if
9: end for
10: for s← 1 to l do
11: cs−1 ← E(s+1)(xs−1)
12: end for
13: return {c0, . . . , cl−1} and {ς0, . . . , ςµ−1}
a different core to work in isolation as shown in lines 11-23. Finally, in the rest of the
algorithm, the server collects the results from processor cores and continues the CPIR
process for the remaining part of the tree.
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Algorithm 12 Server-side computation for binary tree-based Scalable CPIR
Require: m, C = {c0, . . . , cm−1}, F = {f0, . . . , f2m−1}, {ς0, . . . , ς2m−l}, l < m and κ < l
Ensure: Rm,0
⊲ Collapsing subtrees into one subtree
1: µ = 2m−l ⊲ Number of subtrees
2: δ = 2l−κ ⊲ Number of data items assigned to a core
3: for j ← 0 to 2κ − 1 in parallel do
4: for i← 0 to δ − 1 do
5: R0,jδ+i = 1
6: for k ← 0 to µ− 1 do
7: R0,jδ+i ← R0,jδ+i · ς
f
jδ+k(2l)
k mod N
2
8: end for
9: end for
10: end parallel for
⊲ Cores computing in the collapsed subtree in isolation
11: for j ← 0 to 2κ − 1 in parallel do
12: for i← 0 to δ − 1 do
13: R˜0,i ← R0,jδ+i
14: end for
15: for s← 1 to l − κ do
16: for i← 0 to 2l−s − 1 do
17: t0 ← R˜s−1,2i
18: t1 ← R˜s−1,2i+1
19: R˜s,j ← E(s+1)(t0)× ct1−t0s−1 mod N s+2
20: end for
21: end for
22: Rl−κ,j ← R˜l−κ,0
23: end parallel for
⊲ Cores join
24: for s← l − κ+ 1 to l do
25: for j ← 0 to 2l−s − 1 in parallel do
26: t0 ← Rs−1,2j
27: t1 ← Rs−1,2j+1
28: in parallel do
29: q0 ← E(s+1)(t0)
30: q1 ← ct1−t0s−1 mod N s+2
31: sync
32: Rs,j ← q1 · q0 mod N s+2
33: end parallel for
34: end for
35: return Rl,0
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Figure 3: Collapsing four subtrees into one tree
Example 3. Consider a binary tree having 4 levels for a database with 2m = 16 files
as illustrated in Figure 3. Assuming that there are 2κ = 2 processor cores available and
we choose the subtree size as 2l = 4. The chosen values, m = 4, l = 2, κ = 1 are proper
for a scalable CPIR since l < m and κ < l. Since we select a subtree to hold 4 files,
there will be 16/4 = 4 subtrees in our selection (i.e., two selection bits are needed in
addition to the index bits).
Suppose that the client is interested in file f11, marked with red in Figure 3. Nor-
mally, the input bits would be x = 1011 and client would encrypt all of them using
appropriate moduli for each bit and send them to server. However in scalable CPIR
case, client separates m− l bits for subtree selection and remaining l of them for index
bits. In this example setting, the client will separate 10 from x as the selection bits
to compute ς2 = E(1) for the subtree starting with R2,2 and ςi = E(0), i = 0, 1, 3 for
the remaining subtrees. The rest of the input bits, 11, are encrypted for each level of
the subtree, so, the client prepares the encrypted input bits as c0 = E
(2)(1), (x0 = 1),
c1 = E
(3)(1), (x1 = 1). The modulus for the bottom level of the tree is no longer N
2,
but N3 since, as indicated in line 7 of Algorithm 12, now the leaf nodes of the tree
hold encrypted data items instead of plaintext files. This means that we already use a
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modulus with s = 1 for the encryption of the files in the selection operation and in order
to continue encrypting them, we need to increment s. Therefore, in the scalable CPIR,
we start performing the modular arithmetic operations with mod N3 and increment s
as the level increases.
After the server receives ςi, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 and cj , j = 0, 1 calculated by the client, it
starts collapsing the subtrees into one using ςi as depicted in lines 1-10 of Algorithm 12.
In the example case, µ is calculated as 24−2 = 4 and δ = 22−1 = 2. The subtree
collapsing operation is also performed in parallel; therefore we assign the calculation
of each data item that will be on the subtree after collapsing to a specific core. That
core is responsible for retrieving the required files from each subtree, raising them to
the corresponding ςi and multiplying them with each other. Therefore, to collapse our
4 subtrees of 4 files using 2 cores in parallel, each core will be responsible for 2 files.
Precisely, one core will compute R0,0, R0,1 of the new subtree, and the other core will
calculate R0,2, R0,3 as follows
R0,j =
12+j∏
i=j
( ς⌊i/4⌋ )
fi mod N2, i+=4.
Due to the homomorphic encryption by the Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem, the operation
will be a homomorphic multiplication of the files in the unwanted subtrees with 0 since
those subtrees do not contain the requested file, therefore ς = E(0). Consequently
we have, through additive homomorphism, E(0)f = E(0 · f) = E(0). Similarly, for
the subtree that contains the desired file, ς = E(1). Therefore, E(1)f = E(1 · f) =
E(f). Again due to the homomorphic properties, multiplying an ecnrypted file with
a corresponding file in another subtree will result in E(0) · E(f) = E(0 + f) = E(f).
In brief, at the end of collapsing procedure, R0,j will hold E(fj+8) , j = 0, 1, 2, 3 since
f8, f9, f10, andf11 are contained in the selected subtree considering the example database
in Figure 3.
Now, we have a tree with 4 encrypted files at its sink nodes, the remaining process
is similar to previous schemes, except we will start modulus variable s from 2 instead
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of 1. The calculations done in the new subtree for this example proceed as follows:
R1,0 = E
(2)(R0,0) · cR0,1−R0,00
R1,1 = E
(2)(R0,2) · cR0,3−R0,20
R2,0 = E
(3)(R1,0) · cR1,1−R1,01
At the end, R2,0 is sent to the client to be decrypted 3 times since R2,0 is calculated
with s = 3.
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7 Communication and Computation Analysis
This chapter gives the analyses of all the schemes proposed so far, in terms of com-
munication an computational complexity. Firstly, it will start by the bandwidth usages
of new quadratic and octal trees along with the original binary one, then continue with
the computation requirements of new trees and their parallelization also in comparison
with the original BddCpir. Lastly, the performance of the scalable CPIR with octal
trees is evaluated, examining the case when database tree grows larger.
7.1 Analysis of Communication Complexity
A practical PIR scheme should be more efficient than the user downloading all
the database (the trivial solution) in terms of the amount of information exchanged
between the user and the server. Formally speaking, the bandwidth requirements of
a PIR scheme must be sublinear to the size of the database. The bandwidth of the
original (n, 1)-CPIR scheme based on binary decision trees has a logarithmic complex-
ity. The proposed schemes based on quadratic and octal trees also have logarithmic
complexities. However, the actual implementations of these three CPIR schemes have
different bandwidth requirements, which are important in practice.
In PIR protocol, the client sends encrypted selection bits to the server in the first
stage and receives the encrypted data item in the second stage. For a binary decision
tree, the number of selection bits is log2 n, where n is the number of data items in the
database. Assuming fi < N for all data items and |N | is the size of the modulus N ,
the size of the selection bit for the lowest level of the tree, c0 = E(x0), is 2|N |-bit due
to message expansion property of the Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption. The selection bit for
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the second level c1 = E
(2)(x1), therefore, will be 3|N |-bit long. In general, the selection
bit for the level s, cs−1 = E
(s)(x1) will be (s + 1)|N |-bit long.
The proposed CPIR schemes based on quadratic and octal trees require 3 and 7
selection bits for each level of the tree, respectively. This is less efficient than BddCpir,
which requires only a single bit for one level. On the other hand, quadratic and octal
trees are shallower than binary trees; thus it is not immediately clear as to which scheme
offers the best communicative efficiency. This calls for a more detailed inspection of
bandwidth requirements of each scheme.
In an n file database, the binary, quadratic and octal trees would have log2 n, log4 n,
and log8 n levels, respectively. According to this, the bandwidth requirements of the
encrypted selection bits for each type of the tree are given as in Table 1.
Client → Server (# of bits)
Binary Tree [2 + 3 + . . .+ (log2n + 1)] · |N |
Quadtree [3 · (2 + 3 + . . .+ (log4n+ 1))] · |N |
Octree [7 · (2 + 3 + . . .+ (log8n+ 1))] · |N |
Table 1: The bandwidth requirements of the selection bits in different tree implemen-
tations
The size of the response, which contains the requested data item in encrypted form,
is also important since this is a part of the exchanged messages. The bandwidth re-
quirements of the response message sent by the server to the user are [log2n + 1] · |N |,
[log4n+1] · |N |, and [log8n+1] · |N | for binary, quadratic, and octal trees, respectively.
The overall communication cost sums up the number of bits exchanged for the
selection bits and the response, which is tabulated in Table 2 for different database sizes.
The quadratic tree always results in the minimum bandwidth requirements. The binary
case is slightly better than octal tree for database sizes given in Table 2. However, the
octal tree will eventually be better than the binary tree as the database size increases.
For instance, for a database with n = 4096 data items, where each data item is 1 Kbit
in length, the number of bits exchanged will be the same, namely 105472 bits, for both
cases. The octal tree implementation will result in a better communication complexity
for a database of more than n = 4096 data items.
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n Database size binary quadratic octal
2 2048 4096 - -
4 4096 8192 7168 -
8 8192 13312 - 16384
16 16384 19456 12288 -
32 32768 26624 - -
64 65536 34816 31744 38912
128 131072 44032 - -
256 262144 54272 48128 -
512 524288 65536 - 68608
Table 2: Actual bandwidth costs of overall communication for different database sizes
(in number of bits)
7.2 Analysis of Computational Complexity
In this section, we explain why the quadratic and octal tree implementations are
better than the binary tree implementation in terms of the efficiency of server-side com-
putations. We provide a theoretical analysis showing that we should expect a speedup
in server-side computations. On the other hand, the theoretical analysis fails to give
an exact value for the actual speedup, for which we provide the actual implementation
results in Chapter 8.
The most fundamental operation of the Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption, on which an
overwhelming proportion of server-side computations is spent, is modular exponentia-
tion operation, which has quadratic complexity with the bit length of the modulus (i.e.,
N s+1). Suppose that a 1024-bit modular exponentiation takes τ seconds (i.e., N is a
1024-bit number). The first exponentiations performed for the lowest level non-sink
nodes (R1,j) then are expected to take time which is proportional to τ2 = 4τ seconds
each since we work with modulo N2. And the cost of exponentiation increases in a
similar manner as we go up in the tree.
For every node of the binary tree, three exponentiations are performed. In quadratic
and octal trees, we need five and nine exponentiations, respectively, for a node. For
a node in the sth level, we can adopt the following formulas for the computational
complexity, tbs = 3 · τs, tqs = 5 · τs, and tos = 9 · τs, respectively for binary, quadratic and
octal trees. Then, the overall time complexity of binary, quadratic, and octal trees can
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be estimated using the following formulas
T2m =
m∑
s=1
2m−sts for m ≥ 1
T4m =
m∑
s=1
4m−sts for m ≥ 1
T8m =
m∑
s=1
8m−sts for m ≥ 1, (1)
where m is the number of levels in the corresponding tree. Employing the assumptions
on the quadratic complexity of modular exponentiation operation with respect to the
bit length of the modulus in homomorphic encryption, we can compute an expected
speedup values between different tree implementations. For instance, for n = 512 (e.g.,
m = 9 andm = 3 for binary and octal trees, respectively), the octal tree implementation
is expected to achieve a speedup of about 5.32 over a binary tree implementation. As
we will show in Chapter 8, the actual speedup for this case will be over 10. There
are two reasons for this discrepancy. Firstly, we use asymptotic complexity of modular
exponentiations which does not exactly give the actual execution time of the modular
exponentiation for a specific operand length. Secondly, the big integer libraries employ
specific optimization techniques based on architectural properties of the underlying
microprocessor for relatively low bit sizes. As the bit size increases, it becomes difficult
to use the same optimization techniques. For example, we incur a severe memory latency
due to the fact that we cannot keep the operands in registers when the operands become
large.
To obtain the actual timing values of modular exponentiation operations for various
bit lengths, we use one of the most optimized big integer libraries available, GMP on
an Intel Xeon CPU E1650 processor operating at 3.50 GHz and depict the results along
with expected timing results according to asymptotic complexity in Figure 4. In the
figure, we take the actual timing value for s = 1 and log2(N) = 1024 as the starting
point and compute the asymptotic timings using the quadratic complexity assumption.
For instance, the asymptotic timing value for s = 3 (corresponding to the case where we
work with modulo-N4) is taken as 8 ms, which is four times the execution time of actual
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exponentiation time with modulo-N2. As can be observed from Figure 4, the actual
exponentiation times increase faster than expected, which will benefit quadratic and
octal trees. Note that the asymptotic complexity, which is actually quadratic, seems
to be linear in Figure 4 when it is depicted along with the actual timing values, which
increase much faster.
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Figure 4: Asymptotic and actual timings of modular exponentiation for different values
of s when log2(N) = 1024.
Using the actual timing values for exponentiation operations on an Intel Xeon CPU
E1650 processor operating at 3.50 GHz, we estimate the execution times of server-side
computations for various number of data items, and enumerate the results in Table 3.
As can be observed from the table, the expected speedup of using octal tree is up to
about 11.7 when the number of items is 4096. Note that the estimated speedup values
listed in Table 3 are sufficiently close to the actual values given in Table 11, which
shows the accuracy of our timing model, given in Equations 1.
7.2.1 Complexity of Parallel Implementation of Binary Tree
In this section, we provide a theoretical analysis for the complexity of the proposed
parallel algorithms for three different tree-based CPIRs. We will use two metrics to
evaluate the efficiency of the parallel algorithms: i) expected execution time excluding
the synchronization overhead and ii) the number and cost of synchronization points.
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Number of Server Computation (ms)
Items binary quadratic octal
2 4.2 - -
4 26.4 7 -
8 97.8 - 12.6
16 279.6 58 -
32 703.2 - -
64 1628 307 154.8
128 3566 - -
256 7564 1368 -
512 15700 - 1373
4096 131490 23218 11239
32768 1062800 - 90346
Table 3: Estimated timings of server-side computation
The expected execution time uses the time model introduced in Equations 1 while it
does not take into account the time spent in synchronization points, which is practi-
cally impossible to measure in real systems. Therefore, our estimations for expected
execution times in this section will be always less than the actual timing values in
Chapter 8. Nevertheless, the estimations can be profitably used to predict the speedup
gained through parallelization.
The second metric is the number and cost of synchronization points, during which
the processor cores synchronize and possibly exchange data. Naturally, an efficient
parallel algorithm minimizes the number and costs of the synchronization points. For
instance, Step 18 of Algorithm 10 indicates that two cores computing Step 15 and
Step 16 have to synchronize beforehand (i.e., sync in Step 17) since in Step 18, the
multiplication operation needs both q0 and q1 that are computed by two different cores.
For example, one core sends q1 to the other core that has q0 and can now perform
the multiplication in Step 18 of Algorithm 10. Therefore, we need to count these and
similar other synchronization points in our analysis.
The other metric is the cost of synchronization point, which is related to the amount
of data transferred from one core to the other(s) in a synchronization point. While it
is true that multicore processors use a shared-memory model whereby cores share the
address space, each core works with data in its own level-1 cache. Thus, a cache
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coherency protocol [8] transfers data between the caches of cores when a core needs
the data generated by another core. Since the transfer takes place in a system bus
at a certain bandwidth, the amount of transferred data affects the time spent in the
synchronization point. In CPIR protocol, as computation proceeds to the upper levels
of the tree, the amount of data transferred in each synchronization point increases as
well. For instance, the synchronization operation in Step 17 of Algorithm 10 requires
the transfer of q1 (or q0) from one core to the other and the size of q1 depends on
the level of in the tree, namely, s. For example, if we use a 1024-bit modulus in our
Damg˚ard-Jurik algorithm with |N |-bit modulus, the size of q1 is |2N |-bit and |3N |-bit
for s = 1 and s = 2, respectively. We quantify the cost of each synchronization points
by the value of s in our analysis.
We start our analysis by estimating the execution time of Algorithm 10 for the
binary tree. Assuming that 2κ is the number of cores and m ≥ κ ≥ 0, where 2m is the
number of data items, we can obtain the following formula for the time model of the
operations at the server side
T p2m = T2σ +
m∑
s=σ+1
⌈2σ−s · 3⌉τs, (2)
where
σ =


m− κ m ≥ κ
0 otherwise.
For the number of synchronization points, we can derive the following formula
S2m =


2κ +
κ−1∑
s=1
2κ−1−s +
κ−1∑
s=1
2κ−s m > κ
2m +
m∑
s=2
2m−s +
m∑
s=2
2m−s+1 m = κ
m∑
s=1
2m−s +
m∑
s=1
2m−s+1 m < κ.
(3)
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The total cost of synchronization points can be computed using the formula
CS2m =


2κ−1 · κ + 2κ−1 · (κ + 1)+
κ−1∑
s=1
2κ−1−s(κ + s)+
κ−1∑
s=1
2κ−s(κ + 1 + s) m > κ
2m−1 + 2m−1 · 2 +
m∑
s=2
2m−s · s+
m∑
s=2
2m−s+1 · (s+ 1) m = κ
m∑
s=1
2m−s · s+
m∑
s=1
2m−s+1 · (s+ 1) m < κ,
(4)
where κ = m− κ + 1.
Using Equations 2, 3, 4, we can calculate the estimated expected execution times
and precisely calculate the total number and the total cost of synchronization points
for different tree sizes and for different number of process cores. The results are given
in Table 4, where execution times are in seconds. The timing estimations in Table 4
should be taken into account along with the number and cost of synchronization points.
For example, when the number of items is only 64, the gain in the expected execution
times diminishes with the number of cores while the number and costs of synchroniza-
tion points grow very fast. Consequently, we can conclude that using more cores can
deteriorate the performance if the number of items is not too high. Using more and
more cores benefits only very large trees.
7.2.2 Complexity of Parallel Implementation of Quadratic Tree
In this section we perform the same analysis for the quadratic tree implementation
as the one in Chapter 7.2.1 for the binary tree case. Suppose that c is the number of
cores and λ = ⌈log4 c⌉. Then we have
T p4m =
⌈
4λ
c
⌉
T4σ +
m∑
s=σ+1
⌈
4m−s · 5
c
⌉
τs, (5)
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Perf. No. of Cores (c)
No. Metrics 1 4 8 16 32
of no. of
- 7 17 37 77
Items synch.
64
Time (ms) 1628 450 276 206 181
syn. cost - 48 132 320 720
128
Time (ms) 3566 954 553 379 309
syn. cost - 56 156 384 880
256
Time (ms) 7564 1978 1098 697 523
syn. cost - 64 180 448 1040
512
Time (ms) 15700 4045 2169 1289 888
syn. cost - 72 204 512 1200
4096
Time (ms) 131490 33119 16870 8873 4972
syn. cost - 96 276 704 1680
Table 4: Estimation of timing values for serial and parallel implementations with differ-
ent number of processor cores and number of synchronization points and their associated
costs - Binary tree case (using GMP library on an Intel Xeon CPU E1650@3.50 GHz)
where
σ =


m− λ m ≥ λ
0 otherwise.
For the number of synchronization points, we can derive the following formula
S4m =


2 · ϕ+ 7 ·
λ−1∑
s=1
4λ−1−s m ≥ λ and c > 0
7 · 4m−1 + 7 ·
m−1∑
s=1
4m−1−s m < λ,
(6)
where ϕ = 4λ−1 · (2− ρ) · (2ρ+1 − 1) and ρ = ⌊ c
4λ
⌋.
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The total cost of synchronization points can be computed using the formula
CS4m =


ϕ · ̺+ ϕ · (̺+ 1)+
3 ·
λ−1∑
s=1
4λ−1−s · (̺+ s)+
4 ·
λ−1∑
s=1
4λ−1−s · (̺+ 1 + s) m ≥ λ and c > 0
11 · 4m−1+
3 ·
m−1∑
s=1
4m−1−s · (s+ 1)+
4 ·
m−1∑
s=1
4m−1−s · (s+ 2) m < λ,
(7)
where ̺ = m− λ+ 1.
Using Equations 5, 6, 7, we can calculate the estimated expected execution times
and precisely calculate the total number and the total cost of synchronization points
for different tree sizes and for different number of process cores. The results are given
in Table 5.
Perf. No. of Cores (c)
No. Metrics 1 4 8 16 32
of no. of
- 6 23 31 99
Items synch.
64
Est. Time (ms) 307 88 47 34 25
syn. cost - 21 65 85 193
256
Est. Time (ms) 1368 363 189 116 75
syn. cost - 27 88 116 292
1024
Est. Time (ms) 5712 1464 746 411 237
syn. cost - 33 111 147 391
4096
Est. Time (ms) 23218 5860 2954 1538 820
syn. cost - 39 134 178 490
Table 5: Estimation of timing values for serial and parallel implementations with differ-
ent number of processor cores and number of synchronization points and their associated
costs - Quadratic tree case (using GMP library on an Intel Xeon CPU E1650@3.50 GHz)
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7.2.3 Complexity of Parallel Implementation of Octal Tree
In this section, we provide our analysis for the expected execution time, the total
number and the total costs of synchronization points in octal tree case. Suppose that
8m is the number of data items, c is the number of cores and λ = ⌈log8 c⌉. Then we
have
T p8m =
⌈
8λ
c
⌉
T8σ +
m∑
s=σ+1
⌈
8m−s · 9
c
⌉
τs, (8)
where
σ =


m− λ m ≥ λ
0 otherwise.
For the number of synchronization points, we can derive the following formula
S8m =


2 · ϑ+ 15 ·
λ−1∑
s=1
8λ−1−s m ≥ λ and c > 0
15 · 8m−1 + 15 ·
m−1∑
s=1
8m−1−s m < λ,
(9)
where ϑ = 8λ−1 · α · (2β − 1), α = 8
λ
c
, and β = log2
c
8λ−1
.
The total cost of synchronization points can be computed using the formula
CS8m =


ϑ · ̺+ ϑ · (̺+ 1)+
7 ·
λ−1∑
s=1
8λ−1−s · (̺+ s)
8 ·
λ−1∑
s=1
8λ−1−s · (̺+ 1 + s) m ≥ λ and c > 0
23 · 8m−1+
7 ·
m−1∑
s=1
8m−1−s · (s+ 1)
8 ·
m−1∑
s=1
8m−1−s · (s+ 2) m < λ,
(10)
where ̺ = m− λ+ 1.
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Using Equations 8, 9, 10, we can estimate the expected execution times and precisely
calculate the total number and the total cost of synchronization points for different tree
sizes and for different number of process cores. The results are given in Table 6.
Perf. No. of Cores (c)
No. Metrics 1 4 8 16 32
of no. of
- 12 14 79 111
Items synch.
64
Est. Time (ms) 155 43 25 13 10
syn. cost - 30 35 134 182
512
Est. Time (ms) 1373 355 185 95 58
syn. cost - 42 49 213 293
4096
Est. Time (ms) 11239 2831 1429 722 383
syn. cost - 54 63 292 404
Table 6: Estimation of timing values for serial and parallel implementations with differ-
ent number of processor cores and number of synchronization points and their associated
costs - Octal tree case (using GMP library on an Intel Xeon CPU E1650@3.50 GHz)
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7.3 Analysis of Scalable CPIR
7.3.1 Communication Complexity
The new scalable CPIR incurs an overhead in communication complexity due to the
selection bits that are sent to the server. The formula for the number of bits sent to
the server by the user for the binary case can be given as
BWb = (2µ+ 3 + 4 + . . .+ (l + 2))|N |
where 2m, 2l, and µ = 2m−l are the number of data items in the entire tree, the number
of data items in each subtree (l < m), and the number of subtrees, respectively, while
N is the modulus used in the Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem. On the other hand, the
number of bits sent by the server to the user will be (l + 2) · |N |. See Figure 5 for the
bandwidth requirements of the scalable solution for the binary case. In the figure, the
bandwidth requirements of the scalable solution is compared with the original CPIR
scheme (regular in the figure) for different number of data items. As can be observed
from the figure, there is no significant change (for the worse) in the ratio of the number
of exchanged bits between the client and the server to the database size.
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Figure 5: Binary Tree Case: Ratio of exchanged number of bits to database size for
|N | = 1024, l = 9, 10, 11.
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Similarly, we can obtain the following equations for the total bandwidth usage for
quadratic and octal trees
BWq = (2µq + 3 + 4 + . . .+ (lq + 2))|N |
and
BWo = (2µo + 3 + 4 + . . .+ (lo + 2))|N |
where µq = 2
m−2l, µo = 2
m−3l, and lq and lo represent the depth of the corresponding
tree. The effects of the quadratic and octal versions of the scalable solution in the
bandwidth requirements are illustrated in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. From both
figures, we can conclude that the effect is negligible if the size of the subtrees 2l for a
given m is selected carefully.
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Figure 6: Quadratic Tree Case: Ratio of exchanged number of bits to database size for
|N | = 1024, l = 5, 6.
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Figure 7: Octal Tree Case: Ratio of exchanged number of bits to database size for
|N | = 1024, l = 3, 4.
7.3.2 Computational Complexity
We also provide our estimations for the expected execution times of the scalable
solution in comparison with our earlier parallel implementation for the octal tree case
in Tables 7 and 8. We tabulate the execution times only for the octal tree case due
to the fact that it has the best time performance. We obtain similar results for the
binary and quadratic tree implementations. Note that the figures in Tables 7 and 8 are
estimated lower bounds for the expected execution times and do not take into account
the time lost due to synchronization points. As pointed out earlier, the estimations are
valuable in predicting the speedup figures we can obtain.
In Table 7, we use a subtree with 512 data items and change the total number of data
items from 4096 to 65536, where each data item is 1024 bit. As can be observed from
the table, we can obtain significant speedups when the number of data items increases,
which proves our claim for scalability. The jumps in the speedup values in the table are
due to the fact that the octal tree grows by eight when the depth increments by one.
We repeat the same calculations for a larger subtree with 4096 data items in Table 8
and obtain again significant speedup values. Note that having a larger subtree has a
bandwidth advantage over a smaller subtree.
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no. of
Imp.
Exec. Times for No. of Items (s)
cores 4 K 8 K 16 K 32 K 64 K
4
parallel 2.83 22.62 22.62 22.62 180.91
hybrid 2.65 4.09 6.95 9.03 24.16
speedup 1.07 5.54 3.25 1.78 7.49
8
parallel 1.43 11.34 11.34 11.34 90.49
hybrid 1.34 2.06 3.49 6.36 12.09
speedup 1.07 5.51 3.25 1.78 7.48
16
parallel 0.72 5.68 5.68 5.68 45.27
hybrid 0.68 1.04 1.75 3.19 6.05
speedup 1.07 5.49 3.24 1.78 7.48
32
parallel 0.38 2.88 2.88 2.88 22.70
hybrid 0.36 0.54 0.90 1.61 3.05
speedup 1.06 5.34 3.21 1.78 7.45
64
parallel 0.21 1.48 1.48 1.48 11.41
hybrid 0.20 0.29 0.47 0.83 1.55
speedup 1.06 5.07 3.14 1.78 7.38
Table 7: Estimated execution times of the hybrid method for various number of data
items, number of cores, and speedup values over the normal parallel implementation;
l = 3. (using GMP library on an Intel Xeon CPU E1650@3.50 GHz)
no. of
Imp.
Exec. Times for No. of Items (s)
cores 8 K 16 K 32 K 64 K
4
hybrid 12.59 15.45 21.19 32.66
speedup 1.80 1.46 1.07 5.54
8
hybrid 6.32 7.75 10.62 16.35
speedup 1.79 1.46 1.07 5.53
16
hybrid 3.17 3.89 5.32 8.19
speedup 1.79 1.46 1.07 5.53
32
hybrid 1.62 1.98 2.70 4.13
speedup 1.77 1.45 1.07 5.49
64
hybrid 0.85 1.03 1.39 2.10
speedup 1.74 1.44 1.06 5.42
Table 8: Estimated execution times of the hybrid method for various number of data
items, number of cores and speedup values over the normal parallel implementation;
l = 4. (using GMP library on an Intel Xeon CPU E1650@3.50 GHz)
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8 Implementation Results
The implementation consists of all the schemes presented in this work, in other
words, quadratic and octal tree implementations, their parallelization methods and
scalable CPIR are implemented, alongside with the original BddCpir in order to provide
a reference point for our results and support the improvements we claimed. Both client
and server side timings are provided in terms of computational latency (time to gather
a result). For client side secure index calculations (i.e. encrypting selection bits), we
always used the parallelized version. For server side calculations, serial, parallel and
scalable versions are separately presented, as shown in the subsequent sections.
All the protocols are implemented in C++, using GMP, The GNU Multiple Precision
Arithmetic Library, which provides very efficient assembly-level optimizations for big
number calculations [15]. For parallelization and threading purposes, OpenMP is uti-
lized since it provides high-level parallelism for C++ codes running on shared-memory
multi-core processors [27]. The timings that will be presented in this chapter are ob-
tained on a machine running 64 bit Ubuntu 12.04 LTS. The processor is a 6-core Intel
Xeon CPU E5-1650 v2 operating at 3.50 GHz with hyper-threading support. Finally,
cryptographic operations are calculated on a 1024-bit modulus, providing 80-bit equiv-
alent security, which is sufficient for PIR applications.
8.1 Client-Side Computations
The client performs encryption operations to build secure indices (i.e. encrypted
index bits), and decryption operations to retrieve the requested data item. The en-
cryptions are parallelized using algorithms proposed in Section 5.1, however decryptions
are sequential by nature. Table 9 presents parallel client side encryption timings for
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binary, quadratic and octal tree implementations, and Table 10 enumerates decryption
timings. As the results indicate, quadratic and octal tree based CPIR implementations
offer an obvious advantage over the binary tree implementation as far as the client side
computation is concerned.
Number of Items
Client Encryption (ms)
Binary Tree Quadratic Tree Octal Tree
2 2 - -
4 9 3 -
8 21 - 4
16 34 10 -
32 52 - -
64 79 24 16
128 113 - -
256 158 46 -
512 207 - 37
1024 265 82 -
2048 326 - -
4096 741 130 78
32768 - - 143
Table 9: Timings of client’s selection bit encryptions
Number of Items
Client Decryption (ms)
Binary Tree Quadratic Tree Octal Tree
2 2 - -
4 5 2 -
8 10 - 2
16 19 5 -
32 28 - -
64 40 10 5
128 57 - -
256 77 19 -
512 101 - 10
1024 129 28 -
2048 161 - -
4096 360 40 19
32768 - - 28
Table 10: Timings of client’s decryption of the final result
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8.2 Server-Side Computations
The server-side computations are the most time and resource consuming part of
the CPIR protocols since all the items in the database should be processed in order
to reply the client with the appropriate file. Therefore, computational complexity is
directly a function of the database. On the other hand, the involved operations are
often independent thus allow parallelization methods to be applied as defined in the
previous chapters. In the following parts, we present the timing results for both serial
and parallel implementations of CPIR and demonstrate our improvements.
8.2.1 Serial Case
The serial CPIR implementation, which corresponds to original BddCpir in binary
tree case, utilizes only one core of the processor and performs calculations sequentially.
The timings for this case are presented in Table 11.
Number of Items
Server Computation (ms)
Binary Quadratic Octal
2 5 - -
4 31 8 -
8 111 - 15
16 315 67 -
32 718 - -
64 1,659 352 180
128 3,640 - -
256 7,707 1,440 -
512 15,900 - 1,468
1024 32,750 5,950 -
2048 66,370 - -
4096 141,370 24,240 11,930
32768 - - 95,803
Table 11: Timings of server computation - sequential
As observed in the table, with the help of octal trees, we can achieve speedups up
to 15900/1468 = 10.83 for a database with 512 data items. As the number of items
increases, the speedup values also increase as expected: for a 4096-file database, the
speedup is 141370/11930 = 11.85.
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8.2.2 Parallel Case
Among the three server-side parallelization methods presented in Chapter 5, we pro-
vide the timings of the non-trivial one, namely the algorithm introduced in Section 5.4,
in Table 12. Obviously, the parallelization on shared memory multi-core processors
benefits all the CPIR schemes regardless of the tree type.
Number of Items
Server Computation (ms)
Binary Quadratic Octal
2 4 - -
4 22 4 -
8 68 - 6
16 157 28 -
32 332 - -
64 680 129 64
128 1,390 - -
256 2,792 504 -
512 5,556 - 505
1024 11,144 2,027 -
2048 22,249 - -
4096 44,371 8,158 4,033
32768 - - 32,250
Table 12: Timings of server computation - parallel
The benefit of parallelization is more pronounced when the number of data items
is high. For example, with 512 files, we can achieve a speedup of 1468/505 = 2.90 for
the octal tree CPIR and 15900/5556 = 2.86 for binary tree case, whereas in 4096-file
database case, the speedup of octal tree method is 11930/4033 = 2.96, and binary
version is 141370/44371 = 3.19. As the speedup values indicate, the advantage of the
parallel methods are best observed in databases with high number of files.
These results show that using octal tree in the CPIR scheme does not negatively
affect the parallelism in the server-side computation. With CPIR schemes we cannot
achieve the ideal speedup, which is equal to the number of cores in the computing
platform, since the parallelism becomes weaker in the topmost levels of the decision
tree, where the encryption operation is the hardest.
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Finally, from the binary tree serial implementation to the octal tree parallel imple-
mentation the achieved speedup is
141370
4033
= 35.05.
This is an important improvement that brings CPIR schemes one step closer to practical
usage.
8.2.3 Scalable CPIR
The results in Table 13 show the actual timings of the Scalable CPIR introduced in
Chapter 6. Since the method is designed to be effective on the databases with higher
number of items, we only experimented the octal tree based CPIR with depths 4 and
5, in other words, databases with n = 4096 and n = 32768 number of items are used.
For 4096-file case, subtrees with l = 2 and l = 3 are chosen, and for 32768-file setting,
l = 2, l = 3 and l = 4 are used.
Number of Items Size of a Subtree
Server Computation (ms)
Octal
4096
64 2,185
512 2,850
32768
64 16,640
512 17,330
4096 22,660
Table 13: Timings of server computation - scalable
As can be observed in the Table 13, subtrees with smaller number of items produce
the best results for big databases. However, the cost of getting better computation
latencies result in also an increased bandwidth requirement, as demonstrated in the
analysis chapter. In short, for large octal trees, when scalable CPIR is used instead of
parallelized CPIR, we can achieve
32250
16640
= 1.94
speedup with the cost of increased bandwidth usage.
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9 Comparison
There is a relatively high academic interest in efficient PIR schemes [2, 3, 5–7, 10,
12, 18, 19, 23, 24, 28, 31]. One of the earliest proposals are due to Kushilevitz and
Ostrovsky [19], which uses a partially homomorphic scheme based on the difficulty
of quadratic non-residue problem. The database is arranged as a square matrix of
(
√
n × √n), D, where n is the number of data items. The user sends a homomorphi-
cally encrypted bit for each column of the matrix D, where all the bits are 0 except for
the bit corresponding to the column that contains the requested data item, which is 1.
The database server, then, performs homomorphic computations for each row of D, and
sends the resulting ciphertexts back to the user. The user decrypts the ciphertext cor-
responding to the row that contains the requested data. Overall, the user sends β · √n
bits to the server that sends back β · √n bits for each bit of the requested data item
as a response, where β is the size of the ciphertext used in homomorphic encryption
scheme.
Another scheme by Boneh et al. [3] uses additive homomorphic computation of two-
disjunctive normal form (2-DNF) of polynomials. Disjunctive normal form is also known
as sum of products expressions of logical functions in Boolean algebra, which basically
means applying logical-OR operation on the product terms obtained by logical AND
operation on Boolean variables. In 2-DNF in [3], each product term is logical AND of
two Boolean variables. The scheme can use additive homomorphic encryption system
proposed by Paillier [29]. In the scheme, the users sends 2 ·n1/3 ciphertexts as the query
and receives n1/3 ciphertexts as the response. Therefore, the bandwidth complexity is
reduced to O(n1/3) from O(n1/2) of Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky in [19].
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Scheme
Query Size Resp. Size per bit Resp. Size per KB Resp. Size per 64 KB
216 (KB) 232 (MB) 216 (B) 232 (B) 216 (KB) 232 (MB) 216 (KB) 232 (MB)
[19] 32 1 215 223 218 216 224 222
[3] 32 1 16 512 128 4 8192 256
SWFHE [10] 249 32 250 784 2000 6.125 128159 392
SWFHE - Bundled [10] 0.396 0.03125 250 784 2000 6.125 128159 392
Proposed 42.5 32 0.5 0.75 4 ≈ 0.06 256 0.375
Table 14: Comparison of bandwidth requirements in terms of Query and Response
Sizes; for the proposed scheme l = 29 and l = 215 are chosen for the database sizes of
216 and 232, respectively.
The scheme in [10] uses a somewhat fully homomorphic encryption system (SWFHE),
a topic of high interest in the cryptographic community in recent years [4, 13, 14, 22].
Once a fully homomorphic computation is possible (and practical), the selection of the
requested data item is reduced to homomorphic comparison of index bits used to ad-
dress the data items. As comparison circuit is highly simple, a SWFHE based on a
variant of NTRU [17] encryption scheme becomes almost practical for PIR implemen-
tation. For the security assumptions of the NTRU encryptions schemes, see [32]. One
nice property of the PIR scheme in [10], the index bits of the requested data items from
different queries can be packed or bundled into a single query which is the homomorphic
encryption of these index bits. The bundled case can be especially useful when many
queries are generated (perhaps by different users) to amortize the bandwidth overhead
of the PIR scheme. This, however, requires a trusted proxy server to collect and bundle
queries from different users.
In all three schemes [3,10,19], query sizes are reasonably low (see Table 14). Espe-
cially, the SWFHE scheme in the bundled case [10] offers extremely small-sized queries.
However, the bandwidth complexity has two components query and response size and
all three schemes suffer from very high response sizes per one bit of the requested data
item as shown in Table 14. In the proposed scheme, the response is at least more than
one order of magnitude smaller in size than in any other scheme in Table 14. As can
be observed from the table, for even small-sized data items (see the columns 6-9 of Ta-
ble 14), the response sizes dominate the bandwidth complexity and query sizes become
negligible in comparison.
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Since the schemes in [3, 19] are not well known for their computational and band-
width efficiencies we provide a more detailed comparison of the proposed schemes
against two more recent schemes in the literature [10, 23, 24], both of which utilize
lattice-based cryptography. The former lattice-based scheme introduced in [23, 24],
claims computational efficiency while the latter [10], which utilizes SWFHE, claims
superior bandwidth performance over the former while accepting the former is compu-
tationally much more efficient. We demonstrate that our proposed scheme is always
superior so far as the bandwidth efficiency is concerned while the computational effi-
ciency of our scheme is comparable to or better than that in [10], but worse than that
in [23, 24]. However, we also show that the scheme in [23, 24] can have such a poor
bandwidth performance that it is sometimes better to download the entire database in
many circumstances, as also pointed out in [26].
The CPIR schemes that rely on decisional trees use the Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosys-
tem that is based on the decisional composite residuosity assumption [29], which is a
relatively well studied classical problem in comparison with those security arguments
used in lattice-based solutions, especially the one in [23, 24].
We compare the bandwidth requirements of the proposed method with octal tree
and the two other technique in Figures 8, 9, 10. In Figure 8, assuming that each data
item in our database is 1024-bit in size we change the number of data items from 512
to 65536 and illustrate the ratio of exchanged bits (i.e., query + response sizes) to the
size of the entire data base. As observed from the graphs given in logarithmic scale in
Figure 8, the proposed scheme always offers the best bandwidth performance.
Figure 9 illustrates the bandwidth performances of the three scheme, when the
number of data items is fixed to n = 1024 and the data items sizes are changed from
1024-bit to 1 million bit. Figure 10 is similar except that n = 65536. As pointed out
earlier in our discussions regarding the bandwidth performance values in Table 14, the
response size dominates when the size of each data item increases. This is apparent in
Figures 9 and 10 as the bandwidth performance of the bundled case of the SWFHE
scheme is almost same as the regular SWFHE scheme.
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Figure 8: Bandwidth comparison of three schemes when the data item size is 1024-bit;
Melchor’s scheme in [23, 24], SWFHE and SWFHE - bundled in [10]
In Figures 8, 9, 10, the lattice-based scheme in [23, 24] demonstrates a very poor
bandwidth performance. To give a better insight we tabulate the ratios of exchanged
information to the database size in each scheme in Table 15 when n = 1024 and
|N | = 1024. As can be observed in the table, the proposed method always results
in superior bandwidth performance. The lattice-based scheme in [23, 24] requires the
transmission of fewer number of bits than the database size only after the size of the
database reaches 128 Mbit. The scheme based on the SWFHE never offers better
performance than transmitting the entire database in this setting. The SWFHE-based
scheme bandwidth requirements will be acceptable only for databases with many data
items. For instance, for a database with 216 items where each data item is 1024-bit,
the ratio of exchanged data to database size in the SWFHE-based PIR scheme is 0.53,
while it is only 0.03 in the proposed scheme for the same setting.
For server-side computations, the lattice based scheme [23, 24] is reported to offer
230 Mbit/s for a database with only 12 data items, each of which is 3 MB. The proposed
method offers about 1 Mbit/s for a database with 512 data items when the parallel
implementation of octal tree is used. When more cores are used it is possible to increase
the throughput of the server-side computations.
SWFHE-based PIR scheme [10] reports two time performance metrics: i) through-
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Figure 9: Bandwidth comparison of three schemes with variable data item size and
n = 1024; Melchor’s scheme in [23, 24], SWFHE and SWFHE - bundled in [10]
Data item size
(number of bits)
Database size
(number of bits)
[23, 24] [10] Proposed method
1 K 512 K 224 67.21 0.135
32 K 8 M 14.01 7.96 0.016
128 K 64 M 1.76 4.42 0.009
256 K 128 M 0.88 4.16 0.008
2 M 1 G 0.11 3.94 0.008
Table 15: Ratio of exchanged information to database in different PIR schemes n = 1024
and |N | = 1024
put when multiple requests are bundled into a single query, hence the bundled case, and
ii) latency when a request is sent alone (single case). In the bundled case for data items
of 1024-bit long each, the time spent for processing a data item is given as 0.89 ms
while it is 1.00 ms in our scheme. On the other hand, for the latency metric indicating
the waiting time for a user, (which is what matters most for the user) the time spent
for processing a data item is 16.93 ms. For instance, for a database of 512 items each
of which is 1024-bit long, a user has to wait for a query response for about 8.7 s in the
SWFHE-based PIR scheme while in our scheme he has to wait for only 0.5 s, which
corresponds to more than one order of magnitude improvement on behalf of our scheme.
Furthermore, if we use the scalable CPIR and tolerate a slight increase in bandwidth
requirements, we can achieve a better performance. For instance, we can achieve a
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Figure 10: Bandwidth comparison of three schemes with variable data item size and
n = 216; Melchor’s scheme in [23, 24], SWFHE and SWFHE - bundled in [10]
throughput of 1.44 Mbit/s for a database of 4096 items when octal subtrees with l = 8
are used. This will decrease the time spent for processing a data item to about 0.7 ms,
whereby the proposed scheme outperforms the SWFHE-based PIR scheme [10] in terms
of throughput as well.
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10 Conclusion
With the increased usage of cloud servers, this thesis aimed to provide reasonable
bandwidth and latency requirements for PIR schemes to protect user privacy. The basis
protocol was Lipmaa’s BddCpir, which relies on the additively-homomorphic encryption
system Damg˚ard-Jurik and binary decision diagrams. We experimented with the data
structure and observed the effects of using trees with nodes that have more number of
children. As a consequence of our experimentations, we discovered that using quadratic
and octal trees improves the performance of server side calculations without adversely
effecting the bandwidth efficiency. Going more than 8-child trees, however, starts to
increase the bandwidth requirements, thus we limited our interest to quadratic and
octal trees. As our implementation results demonstrate, in a 4096-file database with
1024 bit files, using octal trees instead of binary ones decreases the server latency by
11.85 times.
After changing the data structure of original BddCpir and obtaining substantial
improvements, we continued to investigate the ways to further decrease server-side
latency. The observation of the independent modular exponentiations in the protocols
helped us to develop efficient parallelization algorithms for both server and client sides.
We implemented the parallelized versions of CPIR with all tree types, and subsequently,
achieved a speedup of 35.05 from serial implementation of binary CPIR to parallel CPIR
with octal trees for a 4096 Kbit database.
For moderately small database sizes, the parallelization method with octal trees
provide a practical server operation time (505 ms for a 512 Kbit database), however,
when the number of items or file sizes increase, the scheme again loses its feasibility,
for instance, if the server stores a 32 Mbit database, client has to wait for 32.25 s
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to receive the reply for a PIR query, even with parallelized octal CPIR. Since this is
far beyond practical, we offered a scalable CPIR, to provide applicability of CPIR to
bigger databases. With the new octal scalable CPIR method, 32 Mbit databases can
be processed within 17 s, which is 1.94 times faster than the parallel octal CPIR. Since
we performed our experiments on a machine with 4 cores, this impractical execution
time can be improved greatly using computing platforms that feature higher number of
cores. Since these type of processors are not rather common, we leave the verification
of our claims concerning the scalability of the proposed schemes as future work.
Lastly, we compared the proposed scheme with the schemes in the literature in terms
of bandwidth requirements and found out that the new scheme provides bandwidth
efficiencies, which are better from than those of the other schemes by one to three
orders of magnitude. Also, the adopted security assumption in our scheme is well
studied in comparison with the alternative schemes; another reason for further interest
in the proposed scheme.
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